rmally, CP Axtra) reported that total revenues for all three of its businesses – wholesale (Makro), retail (Lotus’s) and mall rental – crept up by just 0.8 per cent in the fourth quarter. This brought total revenues for the year to 520.7 billion Thai baht ($16.8 billion), an increase of 1.7 per cent over 2024. The sales part of it (that is, revenues excluding its mall rental and services business) grew by 0.9 per cent in the fourth quarter, comprising 5.7 per cent growth for Makro, largely offset by a 5.3 per cent decline for Lotus’s. For the whole year, sales were up by 2.1 per cent, again largely driven by the Makro wholesale side. Mall income was up 1.1 per cent. The numbers are not stellar, which the company largely blames on slower economic conditions, in turn attributable to slower domestic consumption and a 7.2 per cent decline in international tourist arrivals. No small matter in a country as tourism-dependent as Thailand. For Makro’s business, it is particularly meaningful because almost one-third of its customer mix is the HoReCa (hotel, restaurant and catering) sector, and the company is at pains to point out that its sales to that sector have, to some extent, continued to defy the tourism decline. The principal drivers of the 5.7 per cent growth in wholesale sales in the fourth quarter were new store openings, omnichannel, fresh food and private-label products. For Makro, there were seven new openings over the 12 months, six of them in Thailand, bringing the wholesale store count to 170 in Thailand and 11 overseas. The positive impact of the new stores on the top line offset flat sales growth at existing stores. Things were decidedly weaker on the retail side, with sales edging up by just 0.1 per cent in 2025 despite the opening of a net new 24 stores. Same-store sales were down by 2.0 per cent for the year. In the fourth quarter, the company’s particularly notable same-store sales drop of 5.3 per cent was partly attributable to a cybersecurity threat that disrupted its online operations. The IT threat has been resolved, but the company believes that stagnant growth will persist in 2026. Gross margin was well down, to 16.4 per cent in the fourth quarter from 18.6 per cent in the preceding year, as fresh food, which carries a lower margin, assumed an increasingly important role in the sales mix. The end-of-year retail store count was 2,508 in Thailand and 69 in Malaysia. Across both wholesale and retail, omnichannel accounted for 21.3 per cent of company sales in 2025, up from less than 18 per cent the previous year. The target is for 25 per cent omnichannel penetration in 2026. Mall income bucks the trend Makro accounts for 55 per cent and Lotus’s approximately 42 per cent. Revenue from the company’s mall rental business is much smaller but remains an important income stream, growing by a healthy 4.5 per cent year on year in the fourth quarter. For the full year, revenues from this income stream amounted to 14.5 billion baht ($460 million), or slightly less than 3 per cent of the total. Mall income refers to rent from approximately 1.2 million square metres of space leased to small tenants in community shopping malls anchored by Lotus’s hypermarkets. Many of these malls, like their Big C counterparts, are important shopping and social hubs in secondary locations that may not have sufficiently large markets to warrant a full-sized regional shopping centre. The company is also keen to rent more space in and around Makro stores. Big C’s rough year Meanwhile, Big C, the retail arm of Berli Jucker and the head-on competitor to Lotus’s, suffered another quarter of declining sales to end a disappointing year. Sales were down 3.7 per cent year on year in the fourth quarter, bringing the total for the year to 101.0 billion baht ($3.3 billion), a decline of 2.4 per cent. Same-store sales growth remains negative, a situation the company blames on external factors: the ongoing border conflict with Cambodia, flooding in the south of the country and weaker-than-expected tourist arrivals. Certainly, all three of these factors are in play. Still, there are internal issues as well, including frumpy stores that desperately need updating and lower-quality, less differentiated merchandising at its small formats compared to 7-Eleven and Lotus’s Go Fresh, its major competitors. Gross profits for the company’s retail business (sales and rental) declined, as did EBIT margin. (Note that net after-tax profits are not reported since the retail arm is just one of four major business segments in which Berli Jucker is involved.) Both 7-Eleven and Lotus’s Go Fresh have been successful in improving the quality of their merchandise and customer experience over the past 12 months. Small-format supermarkets (or large convenience stores, if you prefer) are immensely important shopping channels in Thailand and Asia generally, and upgrading the food and, to a lesser extent, the health and beauty offer has become an increasingly important strategic goal. While Big C Mini has lagged, 7-Eleven has become a go-to for prepared meals and café-style beverages, and Lotus’s Go Fresh for fresh meat and poultry. Big C, like Lotus’s, has a community shopping centre business anchored by its hypermarkets, and rental and service revenues from this segment also declined, which the company attributed to store closures, tenant mix changes and lower income from utilities expense reimbursements. However, here too, there are quality issues that affect competitive performance. Big C’s community malls are similar in style to Lotus’s malls, but are sometimes scruffier in appearance and less well located in relation to population clusters. The year ahead For both Makro-Lotus and Big C, the year ahead is likely to offer more of the same, with tourism trends a significant swing factor for both: it is not yet clear whether tourist arrivals will rebound, and if they do, there is significant upside for both companies. However, no one is placing bets on that happening. Further reading: What keeps Singapore’s retail growth resilient?